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Abstract 
The majority of experts agree that taxes are distortionary in nature. This is relatively true for all of the different 
groups of taxes, but for the corporate taxes is exceptionally obvious. The existence of corporate taxes can affect 
the company’s behavior in a number of ways and one of them is the distortion of choice of the sources of 
finance. As it is known, companies usually face 2 different financial alternatives to cover their investment 
opportunities: debt and equity (new equity issues or alternatively, retained earnings). According to the principles 
of corporate taxation, since interest payments are in fact tax deductible from the corporate income tax base, the 
debt source of finance is commonly considered as tax preferred as compared to the equity source of finance. 
Similarly, retained earnings are more preferred to new equities since capital gains are usually taxed upon 
realization or eventually exempted from taxation when reinvested. The theory suggests many varieties of 
corporate tax systems that sustain relative capacities to offset the excessive burden on the external equity 
supported investments and thus, eliminate the debt-equity related distortions.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
* Corresponding author.  
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From the wider literature offer, we chose to examine the comprehensive business income tax system (CBIT), a 
proposal of the US Treasury Department and compare it with the basic “classical” approach in corporate 
taxation. The intention is to explore its properties from the view of neutrality and the allocation criteria, for 
which purpose the basic methodology of EMTR is additionally modified and extended. We hope to prove that 
this corporate system has justified its reputation in the sphere of our interest. 
Keywords: comprehensive business income tax, cost of capital, effective marginal tax rate, classical corporation 
tax, debt, new equity issues, double taxation. 
1. Introduction 
Recently, we’ve described and explained the distortions that usually arise from the isolated implementation of 
corporate taxes, a condition which assumes total abstraction of the personal taxes. In this article, we also include 
the personal taxes in our analysis, with intention to explore the investment decision, not only from the 
company’s perspective, but from the shareholder’s point of view as well, a condition commonly referred as 
“double taxation”. This phenomenon is granted to fact that the corporate tax base (i.e. the corporate income) 
cannot be limited only at the corporation observed as a form of legal entity. Usually, under the classical 
corporation tax regime, after the initial taxation at corporate level, corporate profits are distributed to the 
shareholders in a form of dividends, capital gains or interest payments, and are subject to additional taxation at 
personal level.  
The ultimate consequence of the referred phenomenon is imposition of an additional “extra” burden on total 
corporate profit expressed integrally from its source to its destination. Respecting that this “excessive” taxation 
of the profit is considered unfair and could distort the economic activity of firms, the authorities try to construct 
more appropriate “neutral” tax systems with attributions to effectively tax the economic rents (or the extra 
profit) and at the same time avoid taxation of the normal return. In addition, we give a brief literature review to 
some integrated modalities of corporate tax systems with the desired properties, which actually allow a higher 
degree of neutrality in corporate taxation. The following tax systems are protagonists proposals of the OECD 
(Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development), as a part of the tax reform that was undergone 
recently, acknowledged as more convenient to eliminate the difference between debt and equity associated with 
the classical approach of corporate taxation: the Full Integration Tax System (FIT), the Allowance for Corporate 
Equity Tax System (ACE), the Allowance for Shareholder Equity Tax System (ASE), the Comprehensive 
Business Income Tax (CBIT) etc. 
It is a commonly known truth that borrowed capital is a superior source of finance from the taxpayer’s point of 
view, as a result of the usual and widely excepted treatment of interest payments. In practice, since companies 
are allowed to deduct interest payments from their corporate income tax base, the system subsidizes the debt 
source finance in a manner that the action reduces the opportunity cost (the discount rate) of the debt-financed 
investment. This gives a certain advantage to the debt finance, since it is tax preferred in front of equity, which 
oppositely is fully taxed. The last triggers unfavorable behavior of the company, to use more borrowed capital, 
thus increasing the risk of bankruptcy and insolvency of the firm. The last presents the most common and 
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typical distortion of corporate finance, induced by the traditional, “classical” treatment of corporate profit. But, 
as mentioned above, the leading economic organizations such as the OECD, have made a break-through in the 
sphere of business taxation, proposing some alternative models of hybrid tax systems, that are much or less 
distinctive from the classical approach and more evenly allocate the burden across the different sources of 
finance, for example such as the CBIT system. Initially developed and proposed by the US Treasury 
Department, and after accepted and promoted by the OECD, this regime successfully eliminates the need for 
integration between the corporate and personal taxes on equity by imposing a restriction on the possibility to 
deduct the interest payments. In fact, interest income is no longer deductible from the corporate income tax base 
and at the same time is exempt from taxation at personal level. The result should be neutrality and indifference 
between debt and equity.  
2. The applied methodological frame 
We pay our attention here, exclusively on the investments financed with new equity issues (external equity). As 
we know from business practice, equities could be found in 2 (two) fundamental forms: external equity (new 
equity issues), which provides the equity capital for the ongoing projects externally, through issues of the new 
company’s shares on the capital market; and retained earnings (retentions of profit), which are formed from the 
company’s accumulated (non-distributed) profit, usually subject of reinvestment. The models of taxation 
discussed in this article, could be easily applied in the investment scenario covered with retained earnings as 
well, of course modified with its specific circumstances. With the purpose to achieve more detailed, systematic 
approach in exploration of the attributions and specificities of the models, we decided to study them separately, 
and dedicate this article only for the new equity finance. Other reasons for this are the limited space, minimizing 
the risk for confusion, and providing a better comparison of the effects. The basic methodology is consisted of 
the effective marginal tax rates analytical frame (EMTR), which is additionally modified and extended to 
express all the newly occurred conditions that define “double” taxation of corporate profit. With the adapted 
methodology of EMTR, we have managed to identify and explain many varieties of integrated tax systems that 
sustain some relative (theoretical) capacities to offset the excessive burden on the external equity supported 
investment. Here, we present in detail only the Comprehensive Business Income Tax System (CBIT) and 
compare it with the basic Classical Corporation Tax System (CCT). 
To recall, according to Devereux & Griffith [1], [2], [3], the effective marginal tax rate is defined as: 
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In order to isolate the pure effects that arise from the imposition of the code, as well as to simplify the 
calculation for the purpose of a better illustration of the effects, once again, we suggest the following 
assumptions: the net-present value of depreciation allowances is assumed 0 (A = 0), there is no inflation in the 
economy (π = 0, ρ = r), the rate of economic depreciation is assumed 0 (δ = 0) and the real interest rate is 
positive (r > 0). If we consider the previous assumptions and label md as the personal tax rate on dividend 
income, z as the effective personal tax rate on capital gains, mi as the personal tax rate on interest income and c 
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as the tax credit rate allowed for dividends paid, then the tax discrimination variable requires the form of: 
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And the general form of the cost of capital rearranges to: 
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Recognizing the fact that under existence of personal taxes, the financial constraints variable FNE when the 
project is financed with new equities is measured as: 
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Derives a cost of capital for this alternative investment of: 
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While under the same conditions, the financial constraints variable FDE when the project is financed with debt: 
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Generates a cost of capital for the debt-financed investment alternative of: 
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Before we proceed, we’d like to refer to our main analytical tool, and that is, the investment tax wedge 
coefficient defined as (p~ – r) [4].  Depending on the relation between the cost of capital p~ and the real interest 
rate r, we can distinct 3 different conditions. The first condition is when the effective tax burden is positive (p~> 
r) and as a result of that, the tax system depresses the investment activities. In terms of integrated taxation of 
company‘s income, this means that both, the economic rent and the normal return are effectively taxed. The 
second condition is when the effective tax burden is equal to 0 (p~ = r), when the tax system is neutral to the 
investment decision. In other words, under these conditions, the normal return of corporate profit is left from 
taxation and only the extra profit is being subject to taxation. And the third and the most preferable condition 
from the investor’s point of view is when the effective tax burden is negative (p~< r), when the tax system 
supports the overall investment. Here, the investment is being effectively „subsidized“ by the system, enabling 
the investor to legally escape from taxation a rate of return higher than the normal rate of return. In perfect 
economies without presence of taxes, the cost of capital is identical with the real interest rate (p~= r) and the 
economic agents are completely indifferent between the investment decision and the decision to save. The 
existence of the national tax system diverges the difference between the cost of capital and the interest rate and 
therefore creates a positive tax wedge (p~> r). 
3. The Classical Corporation Tax System (CCT) 
First, we’d like to refer once again in detail the so-called „classical“ approach in corporate taxation, which has 
been traditionally the most used and widely practiced form of corporate tax. Actually, the classical system posts 
a true representation of what is known as „double“ taxation and a classical example of the pure separate taxation 
of corporate income. It will serve as a baseline model for comparison of the CBIT system discussed furtherly. 
So, what is the classical corporate income tax system? 
Basically, the CCT is a rudimentary form of corporate tax that treats the corporate income in a conservative and 
fundamental way. It’s a system of taxing companies in which the company is treated as a taxable entity separate 
from its own shareholders. The profits of companies under this system are therefore taxed twice, first when 
made by the company and again when distributed to the shareholders as dividends and capital gains. Formally, 
there is no integration at all between the corporate and personal income tax under the CCT system. In the 
essence of the Classical Corporation Tax is double taxation of corporate income. As stated by Harberger [5], 
„Such a tax system discriminates against the incorporation of business ideas, restrains the supply of equity 
finance necessary for their economic utilisation, reallocates resources from the corporate sector to the 
unincorporated one and thus causes unefficiency loss to the whole economy”. That’s why, according to Kari and 
Yla-Liedenpohja [6], “The need to eliminate these drawbacks led to tax reforms aimed at integrating the 
taxation of corporations and their owners”. So, how could we express the true nature of this typical form of 
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corporate tax and illustrate the effects from it in terms of the proposed methodology? 
Technically speaking, as described by Devereux and Griffith [7], “A Classical System makes no allowance for 
“double” taxation, so that dividend income is subject to corporate income tax and taxed again as personal 
income”.The authorities impose the corporate tax at the corporate level differently from the personal taxes at the 
stockholder level and at the same time do not allow any tax credit on dividend distributions (c = 0). Usually, the 
combination of the levels (percentage points) of the different tax rates falls under discretion of the policy maker. 
Considering this, we can identify the CCIT system as (t, md, mi, z, c = 0). 
3.1 CCT in debt-financed alternatives 
It is easily recognized that the CCT produces a zero investment tax wedge variable if we take in account 
expression (8) that the cost of capital in this alternative is equal to the real interest rate: 
0~ =−=− rrrp (9) 
A conclusion is drawn that, if the integrated overall effect from corporate and personal tax is observed, in every 
case when the investment project is financed with external debt, the system will be neutral to the investment 
decision, ceteris paribus. The introduction of personal taxes do not affect these investments in a different way 
rather than the case of isolated application of corporation tax, so it is evident that the „double“ taxation effect is 
not present here. 
3.2 CCT in equity-financed alternatives 
The implications of the conditions of classical system in this alternative are initially found in parameters γ and 
ρ: 
)1(
)1(
)1)(1(
)1(
z
m
cz
m dd
−
−
=
−−
−
=γ and r
z
mi






−
−
=
1
1ρ (10)
 
Including these in term (6), the cost of capital will become: 
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And finally the investment tax wedge will transform to: 
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Accordingly, as stated in this case by Gruevski [8], “The effects from corporate taxation very often depend on 
the cross-effects from the personal taxation”. Expression [12] shows that the investment decision in this basic 
and most extended version of taxation of corporate income is determined largely from the inter-relation between 
the different personal tax rates (mi and md) and the corporate tax rate t. It is also self-evident, as we can see from 
the absence of symbol z, that the effective personal tax rate on capital income is non-relevant for the present 
model of taxation. The effect from „double“ taxation is quantified with the term (1 – mi)/(1 – t)(1 – md). 
Actually, it represents the combined corporate and personal income tax liability of the CCT, which may have 
variable values depending on the different dimensions of the relevant tax rates imposed by the code. For 
example, if we take the actual situation in Macedonia, where mi = 0% (0,00), md= 10% (0,10) and t = 10% 
(0,10), the combined tax liability would be 0,2345 or 23,34% and with real interest rate of 10% (0,10) would 
yield an effective tax rate on investment of 0,0234 or 2,34% .If we assume that an interest income tax of 5% has 
been introduced lately mi = 5% (0,05), than the combined tax liability would be 0,1728 or 17,28%, producing an 
effective tax rate on investment of 0,0172 or 1,72%. On the other hand, if the corporate and the dividend tax are 
increased on 20% t = md= 20% (0,20) and mi= 0% (0,00), it is obvious that the investment tax wedge will be 
additionally increased on 0,0562 or 5,62%. In the following table some possible combinations of the relevant tax 
rates and the possible outcomes are presented and interpreted in terms of the investment tax wedge coefficient. 
Table 1: Illustration of the possible combinations of tax rates and their effects on investment under the CCIT  
Possible 
combination 
of tax rates 
Example Investme
nt tax 
wedge 
 (p~-r) 
Effects on 
equity –
financed 
investment 
Effects on 
normal 
return and 
economic 
rent 
Effects on 
corporate 
finance 
Effects on 
efficiency 
(allocation 
criteria) 
t = md = mi 10%,10%,10% 1,11% limiting normal 
return and 
rent  taxed 
favors debt distortive 
t  > md = mi 20%,10%,10% 2,50% limiting normal 
return and 
rent  taxed 
favors debt distortive 
t  > md> mi 30%,20%,10% 6,07% limiting normal 
return and 
rent  taxed 
favors debt distortive 
t  > md< mi 20%,10%,28% 0,00% indifferent rent taxed 
only 
indifferent neutral 
t > md< mi 10%,  5%,30% -1,81% stimulating subsidized favors 
equity 
distortive 
t = md> mi 20%,20%, 10% 4,06% limiting normal 
return and 
rent  taxed 
favors debt distortive 
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t = md< mi 10%,10%,19% 0,00% indifferent rent taxed 
only 
indifferent neutral 
t = md< mi 10%,10%,30% -1,36% stimulating subsidized favors 
equity 
distortive 
t = md = 0,mi 0%, 0%, 10% -1,00% stimulating subsidized favors 
equity 
distortive 
t = md, mi= 0 10%,10%, 0% 2,34% limiting normal 
return and 
rent  taxed 
favors debt distortive 
t = mi, md= 0 10%,10%, 0% 0,00% indifferent rent taxed 
only 
indifferent neutral 
t = 0, mi=md 0%,10%, 10% 0,00% indifferent rent taxed 
only 
indifferent neutral 
t = md=mi= 0 0%,  0%,  0% 0,00% indifferent rent taxed 
only 
indifferent neutral 
Source: Author’s calculations and interpretations 
Of course, the Classical System of Corporation Tax could produce in theory some favorable outcomes, despite 
its infamous reputation. As we can see from Table 1, an increase in corporate and dividend tax will generally 
increase liabilities and the burden on investment, while an increase in interest income tax will decrease tax 
obligations and vice versa. If the combined liability of the corporate and the dividend tax from the denominator 
is higher than the interest tax liability from the nominator, the investment tax wedge will be positive, with 
limiting, distortive effects on the equity-financed investment. It is interesting here, that a positive burden can 
occur even when the relevant tax rates are identical (t = md = mi), a situation which is else known as „Flat Tax 
Rate system“ (see Raw 2 from Table 1).  If this combined liability is equal to the interest tax liability, regardless 
the level of tax rates, the system will be neutral and indifferent concerning the investment decision. And in the 
third option, every time when the combined liability is less than the nominator, with no respect to the level of 
tax rates, the system will create favorable conditions, stimulating the equity-financed investments trough 
subsidization of the normal rate of the return. Usually, the authorities avoid the last condition in order to escape 
any additional refunds, and the second one is unlikely to be found also. The circumstance that sustains a positive 
tax burden, actually represents a reflection of what is known as a true CCT system. So, the Classical 
Corporation Tax assumes a positive (non-zero) tax rates with a corporate income and a dividend income tax 
equal or higher than the interest income tax and a right to the company to deduct the interest payments from the 
corporate income tax base. 
We may conclude that the CCT as we know it, produces in total, the highest amount of taxes paid on a single 
unit of corporate profit, entails double taxation, and possess a large distortive potential on corporate finance, but 
as mentioned, only if the interest payments are being continuously deductible from the tax base and the tax rates 
met with the appropriate specifications. Under the conditions of Classical System, the normal return and the 
extra profit at its source and its destination are effectively streamed by the means of taxing regime. But if we put 
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aside these limitations, certain advantages open some new frontiers and possibilities for the CCT. For instance, 
the incorporated principle of CCT for separate and independent taxation of company’s income enables the 
corporate tax from the first stage to act as a withholding barrier for the personal taxes imposed in the second 
stage. Another positive attribution is the simple tax structure. The CCT’s in-build simplicity without any 
complex rules for exempting flow-troughs of capital income raised the idea for the Classical Corporation Tax as 
a global mean of tax harmonization in an international context. These present only a handful of positive features 
of CCT acknowledged from the literature (for more see Kari and Yla-Liedenpohja, 2002). 
4. The Comprehensive Business Income Tax System (CBIT) 
The Comprehensive Business Income Tax System is the first analyzed model of taxation, fundamentally 
different from the classical approach. Originally proposed and promoted by the U.S. Treasury Department’s [9], 
the CBIT implements neutrality in the debt-equity choice in an antagonistic way. The concept of the CBIT is 
based on the idea to avoid the need for integration of corporate and shareholder level taxes by taxing the return 
to capital of corporations only once. Essentially, under the CBIT tax authorities allow no deduction of either 
interest payments or the return on equity from taxable corporate earnings. Moreover, as notified by Brys and 
Heady [10], “Except for the CBIT rate, no additional withholding taxes would be imposed on distributions to 
equity holders or on payments of interest”, thus implying the condition of (t, mi = 0, md = 0). As a result [11], 
„The corporation is therefore indifferent between debt, newly issued equity and retained earnings as source of 
finance of its investment under the CBIT“.  
4.1 CBIT in Debt Financing Alternatives 
First, we’ll resume the impact of eliminated deduction of interest payments from the corporate income tax base. 
The initial effect is loss of the tax induced benefit from the interest payments, and an increased cost of debt from 
r(1 – t) on only r. If we modify expression (7) according to this: 
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Or more precisely, if we calculate further more: 
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As it can be seen from expression (16) the tax wedge is not zero as usual, but is identical with the wedge from 
the case of only corporate taxation of equity financed investment. Actually, with the imposed restriction on the 
interest payments deductibility, the CBIT removes the induced advantage of debt, and creates equal preference 
with equity. Equation (16) illustrates the absence of the personal tax rates within the process of taxation, which 
means that the profit is only taxed once at corporate level under the corporate tax rate t. The last is considered as 
a certain advantage of CBIT, as the single time taxation of the whole profit at corporate level (which means at 
the source of profit), actually eliminates the need for the withholding function of the personal taxes.  
In our example, if the interest rate was estimated 10%, as we know, the usual treatment of debt investment 
would generate a zero tax burden. But under the CBIT, the same interest rate and a corporate tax rate of 10% 
would create tax liability of 0,1111 (11,11%) and a positive burden on investment of 0,0111 (1,11%). 
4.2 CBIT in Equity Finance Alternatives-With no Tax Credit Available, (t, mi = 0, md = 0, c = 0) 
Next, we illustrate the alternative of equity finance investment, without an available tax credit on dividend 
distributions. As we said, after the initial taxation of the profit at corporate level, the CBIT does not impose any 
additional withholding taxes at personal level. The absence of personal taxes imply value of unity for the tax 
discrimination variable (γ = 1), equalization of the shareholder’s discount rate with the real interest rate (ρ = r) 
and accordingly new equation for the cost of capital: 
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This will implicate the investment tax wedge as well: 
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It is obvious from expression (18) that the „double taxation“ effect is neutralized with the implementation of this 
system and the need for integration is effectively avoided.  
4.3 CBIT in Equity Finance Alternatives - With no Tax Credit Available, version (t, mi = md≠ 0, c = 0) 
Similar effect could be provided if the personal tax rates are equal and at the same time different from zero: 
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From the last we can conclude that the implementation of CBIT not necessarily requires the conditionality of 
zero personal income tax rates, but rather the conditionality of equal (proportional) personal tax rates. Yet, this 
rare theoretical form is not popular, since it‘s not compatible with the principals of the CBIT system. 
4.4 CBIT in Equity Finance Alternatives – With a Tax Credit Available, (t, mi = 0, md = 0, c = t) 
Although the purpose of CBIT is to distribute the burden evenly among the different sources of finance, the 
concept of „non-deductibility“ could create a certain preferences to equity only in the presence of a tax credit. 
Regardless that this combination, represents once again, only a theoretical possibility because of its 
contradictory nature, hypothetically the effect is present and could be captured with a slight methodological 
modification. Therefore, if we incorporate plus the condition of c = t, than: 
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0~ =−=− rrrp (24) 
From here we can see that in this scenario the burden is zero, which is less than the positive burden of the 
investment covered with debt. 
Indeed, the method of taxation of interest payments really provides neutrality between the sources of finance, 
but also initiate some serious consequences majorly, for the „big lenders“ in capital market. As described by 
Brys and Heady [12], „A large part of total interest income is effectively not taxed in most countries – for 
instance because tax exempt institutional investors invest a large part of their portfolio in debt. The introduction 
of a corporate income tax on interest payments might then strongly increase the cost of debt finance for 
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corporations. This not only will reduce the amount of investment projects that will be undertaken, but it might 
force corporations into bankruptcy. The CBIT might therefore require a rather low corporate income tax rate”. 
Accordingly, higher cost of debt is the leading limitation of this source-based form of tax. The taxation of 
interest income at the source will negatively impact investors which in compensation will require a higher 
before-tax rate of return such that, after imposing the CBIT, they’ll earn an after-tax return at least equal to the 
real interest rate. To relieve the situation, except the requirements for lower corporation tax rates, the officials 
might want to introduce the concept of CBIT gradually, phasing the implementation over a longer period of 
time. Another problematic issue is the inability of CBIT to secure equality among wage earners, which usually 
fall under the progressive tax rate schedule, and the self-employed, mostly treated under the CBIT’s 
proportional rate. To do so, the income of self-employed need to be separated into a capital income component 
and a labor income component, which is the procedure otherwise known as “income splitting”. However, [13], 
“The choice between capital income and labor income would therefore continue to be distorted under a CBIT 
system”, since they are independently treated under the two different taxing regimes. Additional critics are 
placed on the imposed level of burden and the way how CBIT taxes the profit rate as a whole. Namely, the level 
of tax burden is higher than the alternative systems with a gross return on debt and equity-financed investment 
fully taxed at the corporate tax rate. The last means that the economic rent including the normal rate of return 
are being effectively charged by the CBIT regime. In order to bring in some alleviation, at least for the normal 
return, the CBIT might be accompanied with a kind of relieving or incentive measure, for example, such as the 
immediate expensing of investment [14]. 
Summarizing Table 2 is a reminder of the possible effects from the CBIT system on investment. 
Table 2: Illustration of the possible effects of CBIT on investment 
CBIT 
Variants 
Example Invest-
ment 
tax 
wedge 
 (p~ - r) 
Effects on 
equity –
financed 
invest-
ment 
Effects on 
normal 
return and 
economic 
rent 
Effects 
on cor-
porate 
finance 
Effects on 
efficiency 
(allocation 
criteria) 
t, mi = 0, md = 0, c = 0 10%, 0%, 0% 1,11% limiting normal 
return and 
rent  taxed 
indifferen
t 
neutral 
t, mi = md≠ 0, c = 0 10%, 20%, 20% 1,11% limiting normal 
return and 
rent  taxed 
indifferen
t 
neutral 
t, mi = 0, md = 0, c = t 10%, 0%,  0% 0,00% indifferent rent  taxed 
only 
favors 
equity 
distortive 
Source: Author’s calculations and interpretations 
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At the finishing point, the effects from taxation on investment performance are summarized in Table 3, and the 
qualitative attributions of the analyzed basic model tax systems are given in Table 4. 
Table 3: The effects from taxation on investment performance 
Classical Corporation Income Tax System (CCT)  
Debt 0
 
New equity issues 






−
−−
− 1
)1)(1(
)1(
d
i
mt
mr  
Comprehensive Business Income Tax System (CBIT)  
Debt 






−
−
1
)1(
1
t
r or
)1( t
rt
−
 
New equity issues: Basic model of CBIT without a tax credit 
(t, mi = 0, md = 0, c = 0) 





−
−
1
)1(
1
t
r or
)1( t
rt
−
 
New equity issues: Model of non-zero rate CBIT without a tax 
credit (t, mi = md≠ 0, c = 0) 





−
−
1
)1(
1
t
r or
)1( t
rt
−
 
New equity issues: Basic model of CBIT with a tax credit  
(t, mi = 0, md = 0, c = t) 
0 
Source: Summary and review of author’s calculations 
Table 4: Summary of qualitative attributions of basic model tax systems 
Model of 
tax 
system 
Effects on 
debt  
finance 
Effects on 
new equity 
finance 
Effects 
on 
econo-
mic rent 
Effects 
on 
normal 
return 
Withhold-
ing function 
criteria 
Location 
 specific 
criteria 
Overall 
allocation  
criteria 
 
 (CCT) 
 
favors 
 
discriminates 
 
taxed 
 
taxed 
withholds 
rents and 
normal 
return 
source & 
resi-
dence-
based 
 
distortive 
 
(CBIT) 
 
neutral 
(indifferent) 
 
neutral 
(indifferent) 
 
taxed 
 
taxed 
no 
withholding 
function at 
all 
 
source- 
based 
 
neutral 
Source:  Author’s interpretations 
42 
 
International Journal of Sciences: Basic and Applied Research (IJSBAR)(2015) Volume 24, No  6, pp 30-44 
5. Conclusion 
In this article, we explored the properties of the Comprehensive Business Income Tax system, a proposal of the 
US Treasury Department for neutral corporate tax, accepted and promoted by the OECD. Under the classical 
corporation tax regime, after the initial taxation at corporate level, corporate profits are distributed to the 
shareholders in a form of dividends, capital gains or interest payments, and are subject to additional taxation at 
personal level. At the same time interest payments are deductible from the corporate income tax base. The 
consequence is imposition of “extra” burden on total corporate profit from its source to its destination. Since this 
is considered unfair and could distort the economic activity, the officials of the OECD proposed more 
appropriate “neutral” tax systems with abilities to sustain lower tax burden such as the CBIT system. Indeed, the 
performed examination of the properties of Comprehensive Business Income Tax System, through the applied 
methodology of EMTR, revealed satisfactory results in the terms of neutrality in contrast to the traditional 
Classical Corporation Tax, opening the possibilities for its alternative utilization. 
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